The FAA has published Version 1.1 of its GPS and GNSS Interference Resource Guide, a substantial rewrite of the late-2025 edition produced with input from an industry disruption action team that includes the NBAA. The guide covers jamming and spoofing trends, the effects on aircraft systems, recommended pilot procedures and training guidance — and the agency is explicit that it is aimed at operators, not just flight crews.
The numbers explain the urgency. Per GlobalAir's reporting on the FAA data, GPS signal loss per 1,000 flights rose 65% in the first half of 2024 against the same period in 2023, and Cyprus alone logged more than 5,600 spoofing incidents in a two-month window. The guide identifies eight primary hotspots: the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Russia-Baltic region, the India-Pakistan border, Iraq and Iran, the Korean peninsula, the area around Beijing — and, notably, interference increasingly appearing outside traditional conflict zones, including Mexico, Central America and parts of the Pacific.
It is not purely a conflict-zone or even an international problem: a 2022 incident near Denver, caused by faulty commercial equipment, disrupted civilian flights and air traffic control systems. Europe is moving in parallel — EASA and Eurocontrol have published a joint action plan to combine monitoring and operational data into a shared picture of interference events across European airspace.
For protective operations, this lands in the advance. If the principal moves by business aviation, interference exposure on the planned routing is now a standing checklist item: confirm the operator's crews have current interference procedures, expect degraded-GPS fallbacks (inertial, ground-based aids) in hotspot corridors, and build schedule slack into arrivals where spoofing is active — diversions and re-routes are the realistic failure mode, not losses of aircraft. The Mexico note deserves attention this summer with World Cup movements in volume. And report what you encounter: the FAA asks operators to file suspected interference events with detail on equipment affected and mitigation used — the shared picture only improves if the reports go in.
