The FCDO advises against all travel to the whole of Mali. The driver is JNIM, the al-Qaeda affiliate, which has run a fuel blockade on the country's main supply corridors since 3 September 2025, when its spokesman announced it on video.
The blockade targets the tankers that bring fuel in from Senegal, CΓ΄te d'Ivoire and Guinea. Open-source reporting puts the number of fuel tankers destroyed at over 300, with large strikes recorded between Kaniara and Lakamane, around Kolondieba and near Sikasso. Bamako, SΓ©gou, Kayes, San and Mopti have all seen severe shortages, and schools were closed nationwide for a stretch in late 2025. JNIM reimposed a full blockade on Bamako on 28 April 2026.
The FCDO is explicit: JNIM holds checkpoints on major routes across southern and western Mali, attacks can occur at any time, and there is a high threat of kidnapping across the country, including in the capital. It advises against leaving Mali overland to neighbouring countries.
Operator implication: treat Mali as a no-go for routine business travel. Fuel scarcity is itself a security factor β it strands vehicles, lengthens queues that draw crime, and removes the option to simply drive out of a deteriorating situation. Anyone with a genuine duty to operate there needs hardened ground movement, pre-positioned fuel, current kidnap-for-ransom contingencies and a realistic understanding that British consular assistance and evacuation should not be assumed. The RN1 Kayes-Bamako axis and the borders are the highest-risk lines.





